Abstract -User authentication, as a fundamental security protocol, has been addressed with more concerns recently. Unlike normal authentication processes invoked by a user to access the network, biosensors with healthcare applications normally need to be validated automatically, followed by data transmission to the remote server without any explicit request. Hence, implied authentication procedure involved in such application scenarios shall be addressed. In this paper, a novel tri-factor user 
being under the adversaries' attack. However, since sensors are usually configured with scanty resources including limited power energy and memory capacity, complicated cryptography methods are not feasible for securing WSN in most cases. A powerful but resource-saving security protocol is very crucial. Although there has been significant progress gained in WSN about security of link and network layers, application layer security, which is a basic requirement in many application scenarios, is more or less neglected [1] . Therefore, security is still an open issue for WSN at every level of network infrastructure, which actually becomes an urgent requirement to be met with, especially in applications of healthcare, where wireless biosensors arranged on human body to form a wireless body sensor network (BSN) to play a key role in medical and healthcare monitoring.
User authentication is deployed as a basic solution to implement the data access control, especially in the password-based authentication scheme. It is adopted for remote user authentication [2] . A pair of user identifier and password, as one kind of secure factor, can meet
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the security requirement of information system to some extent. However, for critical systems such as battle environment or special applications like mobile healthcare services, it is not nearly enough. Theoretically, the more independent secure factors combined together and introduced into the scheme, the more difficult for adversaries to attack it. Consequently, more and more multi-factor user authentication schemes have been introduced [3, 4] , which usually authenticate users by two distinct factors considering of the computing and management overhead. Chang and Wu [5] firstly proposed a scheme using smart card as another factor during the authentication process, and Das [1] proposed a practical two-factor user authentication protocol in WSN. In general, smart card is regarded as a physical device and issued to the user who first registers to a system with the capable of powerful computing and lager memory capacity [6] .
This study focuses on the context of wireless biosensors applications for human health monitoring with mobile network access to remote services. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Previous works about two-factor user authentication are summarized in Section II. We introduce the application scenarios and the basis of biometric method, and then propose a mutual authentication protocol for securing communications between sensors and a remote server in Section III, followed by the protocol analysis and implementation in Section IV.
Conclusions are finally given in last Section.
II. RELATED WORK
Since Chang et al [5] proposed to use a smart card to accomplish the authentication procedure, it has been studied in plenty of literatures to be applied into security protocols for access control.
As far as the wireless sensor network is concerned, Benenson et al. [7] had first sketched several security issues in WSNs, especially about the access control and proposed the notion of nauthentication. Hwang and Li [8] proposed a scheme based on ID cryptosystems. Chan et al. [9] then analyzed the flaws of this scheme and indicated that it was vulnerable to the impersonation attack. Subsequently, Awasthi and Lal [10] presented a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards with forward secrecy in 2003. However, Lee et al. [11] pointed out that Awasthi's protocol was incorrect being lacking the ways to get time factor involved in verification phase.
Das et al. [2] proposed their scheme and claimed that it was not necessary to maintain a password and verification table. Unfortunately, Awasthi gave an attack model [12] illustrated that anyone derived from a plurality of biometric input to merge a finally cipher key based on the error correction. Bhargav-Spantzel [17] proposed a two-phase authentication mechanism in which the first one consists of a two-factor biometric authentication based on zero knowledge proofs, and the second one combines several authentication factors in conjunction with the biometric features to provide a strong authentication.
Signal features of electroencephalograph (EEG) and electrocardiograph (ECG) were also proposed to be an irrefutable evidence [18, 19] for user authentication. Sufi and Khalil [20] proposed a novel method of ECG biometric generated from compressed ECG harnessing data mining techniques like feature selection and clustering. Gu et al. [21] worked out a method using photoplethysmograph (PPG) signals to distinguish human individuals in 2003. Poon [22] and Bao et al. [23] proposed and improved a scheme using interpulse intervals (IPIs) of heartbeats to generate entity identifiers (EIs) for mutual authentication among sensors in the same body area, respectively. Miao [24] and Cao et al. [25] subsequently proposed key distribution schemes with improved recognition rate of EIs. Nevertheless, authentication protocol whatever for sensors or users should also be addressed in the application layer. Recently, Shen et al. [26] design a rapid way to identify one's ECG. Overall security solutions across the multi-gateway networks are still research hotspots, and the existing studies under different network environments can be referred to each other [3, to achieve strong authentication adequately, as well as some researches of trusted signature framework [29] in wireless sensor networks.
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III.
APPLICATION SCENARIOS AND PROTOCOL a. Application Requirements
Before illustrate our work, any symbol and its meaning used in this paper are shown in Table 1 . Contemporary mobile devices are getting more and more powerful and intelligent that can act as a key gateway node which connects monitoring sensor nodes with a remote server. In many cases, a mobile device can also be regarded as a sharing device among a certain group of people, e.g. a whole family or a clinic unit. Similar to general User-Gateway-Sensor structures, the 3-layer infrastructure for mobile healthcare systems consists of Server End (SE), Mobile Gateway (MGW) and Body Sensor nodes (BSn). However, the SE always plays a dual role, passive and active, in which the former is providing services when the MGW invokes requests and the latter can accesses the sensors actively after being authenticated by the MGW. Mutual login must be introduced into SE, which is logging or logged in. Furthermore, people who want to check their health status from SE or BSn via mobile devices directly should be permitted after being authenticated. Though a pair of user identifier and password is the traditional method for this purpose, inputting password is sometimes inconvenient or even impossible with biometric characteristics outside the body, such as fingerprint for a physically disabled person. Hence, using more general biometrics as a kind of authentication factors is needed.
The Figure 1 shows a typical application scenario under our requirement specifications. Proposed protocol would be implemented over these real equipments. A mini hotter, which is placed on the one's chest, can measure people's heart beat and breathe rate, described as ECG and PPG signals.
IPIs can be generated from this information. A specialized application built in mobile can receives the data from these nodes by Bluetooth, generated a group of pattern vectors, and then transmits them to the server end for the sake of comparing with the legal/registered pattern vectors stored previously. Obviously, mobile plays a gateway at that time, and smart card id and user/password are also can be opted to enhance the security strength of the whole system if necessary. That's the reason why this scheme is so called tri-factor authentication: a pair of username with password, a smart card with build-in variable security parameters to protect session and some kind of biometric features such as IPI pattern vectors.
b. Pattern Vectors Generation
As aforementioned, using biometrics methods to distinguish one bio entity from the others is getting more and more popular. According to our experiments, original ECG signals are However, it is very hard to identify directly by wave shape in machine context, and we need to sample and convert it to digital entity identifier that appropriate for computer processing. Overall, the two categories of entity identifier generation scheme with biometrics ways are based on the [23] . Our scheme takes advantage of timing information of heartbeat, so the former is proper for this solution.
Ref. [23] also analysis the characteristics of ECG and PPG signals, and gives the EI generation scheme based on IPI information. Figure 3 shows the extracted IPI information from the collected synchronous signals of ECG and PPG. 
Supposing a contraction mapping^:
, where L is a positive integer referred to as a modulo parameter, and q is a small integer. So, the random of multi-IPIs and compensation of differences among various BSnode can be achieved by this mapping, i.e., equation (2) shows us,
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where L > q and -returns the largest integer less than or equal to ( ) 2
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Secondly, we made a few necessary assumptions as follows:
(1) Mobile device is a gateway and also an authenticator.
(2) Seeing that secrets and biometrics are used, pattern vector is a key factor instead of password.
(3) Users in this authentication scheme are classified into two groups according to applications, where one kind of users need to input password as they are not the subject under health monitoring and thus do not have biometric patterns, and the others are subjects who need to be verified by biometric patterns directly, assuming that two categories have no intersection.
(4) Every BSn can be accessed by users via MGW authentication and provide data to requestors.
At last, the proposed protocol analyzed and divided into 4 phases, namely request registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and security materials update phase. Each phase is described as below.
(1) Request Registration Phase: sensors and owners who want to trigger the service of SE must initially register into MGW with their patterns. The other users also must be authenticated by MGW with user identifier and password. Use User to represent the set of {O i , S j , U k }. MGW has initial ID k , PW k and PV i , all set to null value initially.
Step1. User MGW:
Step3. MGW User: Smart card with the parameters {h(.), where T is the current timestamp of login activity
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Step2. User→MGW: <CID, C, T> (3) Authentication Phase: upon receiving the login request <CID, C, T> at time T 1 , the MGW authenticates user by the following steps:
Step1. Validate the timestamp by checking whether T 1 -T < T or not, where T is the expected time interval for transmission delay. Only those requests with less than T can be accepted by MGW.
Step2. Computes h(ID
Step3. Checks if (C * == C) holds to accept login and continue to next steps; otherwise, rejects the request of user.
Step4. MGW computes A = h(CID || h(S j || x a ) || T 2 ), where T 2 is current timestamp of the authentication step.
Step5. MGW→S j : <CID, A, T 2 >. A is used to verify whether the MGW is the real gateway or not, where the message originally comes from.
Step6. S j checks the time validity with T 3 -T 2 < T, where T 3 is currently timestamp when S j receives the message <CID, A, T 2 > at Step5. If T is expired, terminate the process or else continue to the next step.
Step7. S j computes A * = h(CID || h(S j || x a ) || T 2 ) and checks if (A==A * ) holds to indicate the legal access to sensor node; otherwise, rejects the request.
Step8. S j computes M = h(h(S j || x a ) || T 4 ) which is then provided to MGW for mutual authentication, where T 4 is current timestamp.
Step9. S j → MGW: <M, T 4 >.
Step10. At time T 5 , upon receiving the message, MGW also checks if (T 5 -T 4 < T) to continue; otherwise, terminate the process.
Step11. MGW computes M * = h(h(S j || x a ) || T 4 ) and checks if (M==M * ) holds to indicate the sensor S j is legitimate and mutual authentication is accomplished
Step12. As long as the aforementioned steps successfully passed, User can start the legal access to the system. 
Step2. Smart card replaces N with N * and h(PW k || PV i ) with h(PW * k || PV * i ) As for those out dated vectors, just remove from patterns library on the server end directly. Any fresh requisition of authentication would be process from the registration phase again. In overall, we can summarize the whole authentication procedure with sequence diagram, as shown in Besides the security issues about guessing, replay, stolen-verifier, and node-compromise threats discussed in [6, 8, 11, 14] , some further analyses about the security performance of our proposed scheme are needed after introducing pattern vector as an independent security factor.
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(1) Forgery attack or impersonation attack. It always happens in wired and wireless networks.
In our scheme, an attacker must possess the correct login information <CID, C, T> without prior legal registration phase. However, the secret x a , user password and pattern information are all protected by h(PW k || PV i ) and h(x a ), which are impossible to be used by attackers for impersonation. Moreover, it is impossible to generate the identical PVs from biometric patterns as long as the sensing source is different. Figure 9 Smart card is assigned to this user previously with the stored value of "smartcard_id" attribute which indicates where can be found about the user's legal privileges to handle device, own security materials and common keys. If the value of "smartcard_id" of current smart card is not consistent with the previous registered to the MGW, the authentication procedure should be terminated. With the correct smart card, the authentication routine can fetch the corresponding pre-set K and temporary session key x a by this id to process authentication procedure. Figure 9 . User information stored in database Successively, the authentication event is lunched and recorded into another data collection, as Figure 10 shows. This item recorded the corresponding user's PPG and ECG information.
Therefore, the routine can seek the registered user's detail by the id, e.g., "UserId:
ObjectId("50ea7a8ecf0a926055000001")", to proceed with the following mutual authentication. For any illegal user, at least one of the three factors is absent: Anyone who's PV is not to be registered before, or can not match with the original one stored in database, as well as failing to compute secure proof in smart card, the whole authentication is failure. After analysis in segment Section IV.(a), the adversaries is also hard to attack this proposed scheme without legal PV information, although the password or temporary session key may be comprised.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The security issues in BSN are paid more close attention with the popularization of biosensors applications. In addition to the traditional user-name/password pairs for user authentication, another novel method is to exploit the physiological characteristics readily available at individual sensors in BSN for entity identifier generation to enhance the subsequent authentication process.
Through the analysis of special security requirements for wireless body sensor networks with healthcare applications, we have proposed a protocol in this study to unify these cases with the set of User concept and construct a compound identifier to form a universal authentication material for the sake of convenience. Thanks to the special characteristic of physiological signals, e.g. ECG and PPG, more authentication factors like IPI pattern vectors besides user password can be deployed to increase the security level in addition to the secret x a and symmetric keys in the existing protocols. As a result, a novel tri-factor user authentication with mutual access can thus be designed specially for the sensor networks involved in healthcare applications. A real application system is also implemented with this mechanism. By bonding biometric and passwords, it has been proved that the security of the resultant authentication transaction is stronger than one or two-factor authentication schemes due to the independence among these multiple factors. The cryptanalysis of this protocol also indicates that the ability of resisting against attacks is strong and flexible enough. 
